‘Truth is the cry of all, but the game of few.’
-George Berkeley
Consider a hypothetical scenario wherein a basket is filled to the brim with a profusion of fresh fruits. In an attempt to introduce an additional fruit, one soon realizes the impracticality of this task without causing damage to those situated at the bottom of the container. In the course of resolving this dilemma, a decision is made to remove a newly harvested fruit from the uppermost layer. It causes contemplation regarding the possibility that an earlier recognition of a rotten fruit at the bottom could have allowed for its facile removal, given that it was inherently compromised from the moment of harvest. Subsequently, the fresh fruit would have occupied its allotted space without any considerable effort .
A parallel acknowledgement was made within the realm of metaphysics by the youthful George Berkeley (1685-1753). Berkeley aspired to uncover a unifying thread between the material and immaterial domains. Unfortunately, the idea of a perceptual experience based on entities that simultaneously have both material and immaterial qualities inherently contradicts itself. In other words, it is impossible for an object to both possess material and immaterial qualities. Ultimately, stripped of optimism, Berkeley resolved to eliminate the element that obstructed the attainment of a plausible conclusion. Similar to removing fresh fruit instead of the spoiled one, Berkeley resorts to removing the principle of “good” and “fresh” in his theory, namely, the matter. This marked the inception of the philosophical doctrine referred to as “idealism.” Over time, this ontological doctrine underwent diverse adaptations by Kant (transcendental idealism) and Hegel (absolute idealism).
Within the scope of this article , I will concentrate upon the arguments underpinning subjective idealism as elucidated by Berkeley. Additionally, I will examine the critical perspectives that underscore the dubious credibility engendered by this mode of apprehending the external world.
The philosopher George Berkeley employs a central empirical tenet to reinforce his argument for the nonexistence of material substance. His position posits that all human perceptions are but a façade concealing the true essence of reality; they are not the veritable substratum lying beneath. According to Berkeley, the sole perceptible sources at our disposal consist of our own ideas, which act as mirrors reflecting the external world through the prism of our individual perception. Regrettably, Berkeley eventually undermines even this foundational argument in the process of refining his philosophical theory.
Within the opening dialogue of his seminal work ‘Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous’[1],Berkeley satirizes John Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities. This critique leads to an intuitively derived conclusion that material substance lacks genuine existence.
Locke’s position posited the existence of an external reality—a physical world independent of our minds—that gives rise to diverse experiences and various interpretations when we interact with it. In contrast, Berkeley argued that this external reality does not exist independently of minds. According to him, all that exists are perceptions and ideas in the human mind, and there is no independent material reality that generates these perceptions.
In Berkeley’s own philosophical framework, primary qualities (including attributes such as shape, solidity, and motion) are perceived subjectively , much akin to secondary qualities (such as odor, color, and temperature). Berkeley states his perspective with an example introduced firstly by Locke: a person can, simultaneously, experience one cold hand and another warm one. When both hands are submerged in water, different temperatures are felt by the individual. However, a paradox arises when one asserts that the water is simultaneously warm and cold. This leads to the speculation that temperature exists solely within the confines of the human mind, rather than being an inherent property of the water itself.
Transitioning his discourse to the realm of primary qualities, Berkeley articulates that these fundamental attributes are essentially indistinguishable from secondary qualities, asserting that they, too, lack independent existence apart from the mind of the perceiver, residing only within the framework of the perceived object itself.
By systematically dismantling all the empirical principles championed by Locke, Berkeley arrives at the conclusion that matter is, in essence, a phantom—a mirage in comparison to ideas that are perceived emanating from other ideas in an endless chain of perception, ad infinitum. This infinite regress provokes a puzzling question: How may we reliably discern that which is REAL from that which is a mere product of our own imaginative faculties?
The human nervous system,operates without a filter in this context. If ideas cannot be subjected to a comparative analysis against objective reality, then they would, by extension, be transmitted to the realm of nonexistence. Hence, the logical culmination of Berkeley’s argument asserts that the human mind and the external world are fundamentally distinct and divergent entities. Berkeley, of course, maintains that two bodies devoid of any inherent connection or interaction cannot effectively engage with each other. Consequently, the ultimatum he posits is that the sole existent substance is that of ideas, contingent upon the perceiving mind. If, indeed, everything that falls within the scope of perception is rooted in sensory qualities, it follows that the material realm, in its entirety, is rendered intangible, insensible, and devoid of substantial existence. Pursuing this line of thought logically, an entity cannot concurrently possess qualities of sensibility and insensibility. Hence, only entities endowed with sensibility can exert an influence upon the human mind: only ideas can effectively influence other ideas.
However, in the absence of an external material world, a fundamental question emerges: from where do we derive the totality of information that accumulates throughout the course of our lives? Surely, it cannot be posited that this information arises haphazardly at unexpected junctures. In order to navigate this impasse without excessive complication, the philosopher George Berkeley postulates a reasoning that posits God as both the originator of our ideas and the sustainer who keeps the conceptual frameworks of each individual continually updated. This particular facet of Berkeley’s philosophical stance constitutes an irresolvable and deeply problematic element within the framework of subjective idealism.
These arguments serve to substantiate his overarching thesis, which endeavours to establish the nonexistence of material substance, thereby compelling us to consider and reconfigure our perceptions of the surrounding sphere. However, a paradox emerges when one scrutinises Berkeley’s seemingly illogical conclusion: that, in truth, God exists, and the entire fabric of reality is composed of the preconceived notions held by the Creator. To lend reliance to this assertion, Berkeley would have needed to furnish incontestable proof regarding the existence of God, as well as the existence of other external minds—an undertaking that is, in essence, insurmountable. Consequently, the sole method of persuasion at Berkeley’s disposal resides in the realm of linguistic manipulation rather than substantive, tangible evidence. Such an attribute is inherent to the realm of religious metaphysics, where faith often substitutes empirical experience.
Characteristic to this abstraction, however, are elements of vulnerability and improbability that serve to diminish Berkeley’s credibility, particularly in the eyes of skeptical observers and critics. It is worth noting that a considerable body of readers and philosophers have not hesitated to characterise Berkeley’s notions as enigmatic and labyrinthine, expressed through ambiguous terminology. As philosopher G.E. Moore notably put forward during a lecture while raising his hands consecutively in front of his audience: “Here is one hand, and here is another.” This simple and intuitively evident gesture was meant to emphasise the inherent absurdity in doubting something as fundamentally self-evident as the existence of material substance.
In conclusion, the theory of subjective idealism, as advanced by Berkeley, rests upon a foundation of inherent improbability, engendering an enumeration of unanswered questions and astonishing complexities. It is not uncommon for a significant group of readers and thinkers to view Berkeley’s intellectual pursuits with skepticism, even going so far as to ascribe mental instability or delusion to his sophisticated and enigmatic concepts.
[1] Berkeley, George. Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous. Oxford University Press, 1998.
